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THE THIRD CIRCUIT ADOPTS THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE
TO PREVENT DEFENDANTS FROM "PICKING OFF"
REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS OF PUTATIVE
CLASS ACTIONS IN WEISS v. REGAL COLLECTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts are grappling with the conflict between Rules 23 and
68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Rule 23, which governs class
action lawsuits, allows courts to hear and resolve similar claims of numer-
ous plaintiffs in a single lawsuit. 2 Rule 68 encourages the settlement of
disputes and discourages frivolous or unnecessarily lengthy litigation.
3
Standing alone, these rules are admirable and beneficial to the judicial
system. 4 Nonetheless, their simultaneous operation has created a great
1. See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 344 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004)
("Courts have wrestled with the application of Rule 68 in the class action context
... ."); Richard K Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness Gap in Federal Court Class Ac-
tions, 35 STAN. L. REv. 897, 897 (1983) ("Application of the mootness doctrine to
class actions has confounded the Justices of the United States Supreme Court.")
(footnote omitted); Pitney Hardin, Class Actions-Third Circuit Resolves Tension Be-
tween Class Actions and Offers ofJudgment, Alerts, at: http://www.pitneyhardin.com/
news/ClassActionsTension.html (last visited July 4, 2005) (noting tension between
Rules 23 and 68).
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes (1937) (explaining that
Rule 23 was intended to incorporate Equity Rule 38 which allowed courts to re-
solve claims "of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court").
3. See 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 68.0212], at
68-7 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing fundamental reasons for adoption of Rule 68); see
also Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1985)
(stating that Rule 68 is "the only procedural rule devoted exclusively to
settlements").
4. See David Hill Koysza, Preventing Plaintiffs from Mooting Class Actions by Pick-
ing Off Named Plaintiffs, 53 DUKE L.J. 781, 782, 789 (2003) (commenting on bene-
fits of each respective rule). Koysza notes, however, that Rule 23 class actions are
certainly not without critics. See id. at 782-83 (recognizing that "pages of reputable
journals and reporters are filled with descriptions of litigation-mad, bottom-feed-
ing, money-hungry, professional plaintiffs lawyers") (internal quotations omitted).
On the other hand, the class action device has been described as "'a complex
machinery capable of rectifying huge wrongs spread amongst millions of people
who, standing alone, would lack both the incentive and the ability to act with such
curative effect.'" See id. at 783 (quoting Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 402-03 (2003)). Koysza does not argue for or
against class actions, but instead bases his argument on the fundamental assump-
tion that "class actions are a good thing, useful enough to be worth preserving."
Id. at 782. Similarly, this Casebrief will not debate the merits of class actions and
will assume that class actions are worth preserving.
(1285)
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deal of conflict and has resulted in the "picking off" of named class repre-
sentative plaintiffs by defendants.
5
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to be interdepen-
dent, and "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." 6 In the event of a con-
flict, however, one rule may have to take precedence over the other.7 In a
growing trend, many courts have allowed defendants to short-circuit the
class action process by conveying full offers of judgment under Rule 68.8
These courts held cases as moot even though the plaintiff did not accept the
offer of judgment.9 Some commentators argue that this application of
Rule 68 allows defendants to force dismissal of pending class actions and
therefore deny qualified class plaintiffs the ability to take advantage of the
Rule 23 class action device.
10
This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit's approach to preventing
defendants from picking off representative class action plaintiffs prior to
plaintiffs' filing for class certification. Part II discusses the approach taken
by the United States Supreme Court and the federal district courts in de-
termining the effect of full offers ofjudgment to a named plaintiff in class
action lawsuits.1 " Part III examines Weiss v. Regal Collections'2 and the
Third Circuit's use of the "relation-back" doctrine to prevent defendants
5. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (warning
against potential danger of allowing defendants to pick off class action plaintiffs);
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 982 (3d Cir. 1982) (establishing picking off
as name for practice of mooting class action plaintiffs claims through offers of
judgment); Koysza, supra note 4, at 781 (noting that many courts, including Su-
preme Court, describe offering judgments to class action plaintiffs in order to
render their claims moot as picking off of plaintiffs).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing scope and purpose of Rules).
7. See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (articulat-
ing Third Circuit stance as attempting to harmonize Rules when possible).
8. See Koysza, supra note 4, at 781-82 (lamenting that "[a]n already significant
and growing number of federal district courts have held that such offers of judg-
ment . . . requir[e] . . . dismissal of the entire class action"). In this Casebrief,
"full" offers ofjudgment refer to those offers that provide a plaintiff with the maxi-
mum amount of recovery available by statutory recovery limitations.
9. See, e.g., Ambalu v. Rosenblatt, 194 F.R.D. 451, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (hold-
ing plaintiffs claim moot following unaccepted offer of judgment for maximum
statutory amount).
10. See EugeneJ. Kelley, Jr., et al., Offers ofJudgment in Class Actions: Do Defend-
ants Have a Secret Weapon?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 283, 283 ("Recent con-
sumer finance cases suggest that when faced with the daunting task of defending a
class action lawsuit, a defendant can make an offer of judgment . .. which will
derail the potential class action.. . ."); Koysza, supra note 4, at 782 (arguing against
allowing defendants to pick off class action plaintiffs).
11. For a discussion of the approaches employed by the Supreme Court and
the federal courts when considering whether offers of judgment render a class
action moot, see infra notes 16-102 and accompanying text.
12. 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2004).
1286 [Vol. 50: p. 1285
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from picking off a named plaintiff prior to class certification. 13 Part IV
predicts that other circuit courts will follow the Third Circuit's ap-
proach.14 Part V concludes that the Third Circuit has adopted the best
approach for both furthering the purposes of class action lawsuits and pro-
viding remedies for harmed plaintiffs who otherwise would not receive res-
olution of their claim.
15
II. PICKING OFF PLAINTIFFS IN FEDERAL CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
Before assessing the merits of the Third Circuit's use of the relation-
back doctrine to prevent defendants from picking off named plaintiffs, a
closer look at the causes of the conflict between Rules 23 and 68 is in
order. First, Part II.A introduces the Rule 23 class action mechanism.
1 6
Second, Part II.B discusses Rule 68 offers of judgment.17 Third, Part II.C
considers the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution.' 8 Last,
Part II.D examines Supreme Court precedent and the various district
court approaches to determine whether offers of judgment render cases
moot and deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 19
A. Introducing Class Action Lawsuits: Rule 23 and the
Requirement of Filing for Certification
Rule 23 authorizes a discrete number of litigants to aggregate their
claims and proceed as a class against a common defendant. 20 In class ac-
tion lawsuits, a named plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts that
bring the case within the parameters of Rule 23.21 To meet this burden,
Rule 23 first requires the plaintiff to satisfy four prerequisites. 22 Stated
13. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's adoption of the relation-back doc-
trine, see infra notes 103-39 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of why other circuits will adopt the Third Circuit's ap-
proach, see infra notes 140-61 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit's approach is the best approach
to further the purposes of class actions and provide just results, see infra notes 162-
63 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of class actions as defined by Rule 23, see infra notes 20-
31 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of offers of judgment as defined by Rule 68, see infra
notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Constitution's case or controversy requirement, see
infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the way in which the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have dealt with mootness caused by offers ofjudgment made to class repre-
sentatives, see infra notes 48-102 and accompanying text.
20. See Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law" Problem in
Rule 23(B)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 835, 835 (2000) (summa-
rizing purpose and theory behind class actions).
21. See 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS
§ 7:16, at 64 (4th ed. 2002) (detailing procedural requirements of class actions).
22. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). The Rule provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of
GASEBRIEF 12872005]
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generally, Rule 23 requires: (1) the existence of a numerous class; (2) the
existence of a common question of fact or law in all cases; (3) that the
claims or defense of the representative be typical of the class; and (4) that
the representative must adequately represent the class.23 Second, Rule 23
requires that a proposed action fall into one of the following three speci-
fied categories: (1) the proposed action will create a risk of inconsistent
results or determine the outcome of other proposed actions; (2) the pro-
posed action is appropriate because the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act in the same manner toward the class; or (3) the proposed
action possesses common questions of law or fact applicable to the individ-
uals. 2 4 These categories specify how common the question of fact or law
must be in order to certify a class.2
5
Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this Casebrief, an
action is not deemed a class action until the court grants a motion filed by
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
23. See id.
24. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). The Rule states:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of sub-
division (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the inter-
ests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their inter-
ests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any liti-
gation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concen-
trating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
Id.
25. See id. (delineating requirements for class certification).
1288 [Vol. 50: p. 1285
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the named plaintiff requesting class certification. 2 6 According to the Su-
preme Court, a "ruling on the certification issue is often the most signifi-
cant decision rendered in ... [a] class-action proceeding." 27 As discussed
below, certification of a class is important indeed as it prevents the moot-
ing of the class action suit through offers of judgment. 28
Given Rule 23's specificity and the importance of class certification, it
is odd that Rule 23 noticeably lacks a temporal requirement for filing the
motion for certification of the class.29 Some jurisdictions, such as the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, have
established a time period within which motions for certification must be
filed.30 On the other hand, in jurisdictions that do not provide rules for
governing the timely filing of motions for class certification, the temporal
requirements are vastly different. 3 1
B. Rule 68 Offers of Judgment
Rule 68 allows for offers ofjudgment to plaintiffs and was "adopted to
promote settlements and avoid protracted litigation." 32 According to the
Supreme Court, "[t]he Rule prompts both parties to a suit to evaluate the
risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of
success upon trial on the merits." 33 This Rule allows defendants to convey
offers ofjudgment to plaintiffs, who then have a choice to either accept or
26. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (1) (A) (requiring courts to determine whether
actions are certifiable as class actions). Prior to a court's granting of class certifica-
tion, the class is commonly referred to as a putative class. See Koysza, supra note 4,
at 782 (referring to uncertified class as putative class).
27. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
28. For a discussion of why certified class actions are not susceptible to moot-
ness, see infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
29. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (1) (A) ("When a person sues or is sued as a repre-
sentative of a class, the court must-at an early practicable time--determine by order
whether to certify the action as a class action.") (emphasis added); see also Koysza,
supra note 4, at 785 ("Practice under Rule 23(c) gives the court flexibility in deter-
mining the appropriate time to consider the issue of class certification.").
30. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 23.1(c) (requiring named plaintiffs to file motion
for certification within ninety days of filing their complaint).
31. See CoNTE & NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 7:14, at 47 ("When the cases are
examined, one finds that each suit has its own case history and surrounding cir-
cumstances that affect the practicabilities of reaching an initial class
determination.").
32. MooRE, supra note 3, § 68.02[2], at 68-7 (noting primary purpose of
Rule).
33. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). Whether Rule 68 has accom-
plished its goals is, of course, up for debate. See Comm. on Rules of Practice &
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and
Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, reprinted in 102 F.R.D. 407,
433 (1984) (referring to past failures of Rule 68 and noting that it "has been con-
sidered largely ineffective as a means of achieving its goals").
20051 CASEBRIEF 1289
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reject the offer within ten days.3 4 If the plaintiff accepts the offer, one of
the parties files notice with the clerk and judgment is entered.3 5 If the
offer is rejected, the plaintiff agrees to pay the defendant's attorneys' fees
and costs if the amount awarded at trial is less than the offer.3 6 Rule 68,
while enacted to benefit both the judicial system and the parties to a law-
suit, has also led to protracted litigation and controversy when used in the
context of class action lawsuits.37 The controversy centers on whether
Rule 68 full offers of judgment-offers for the maximum possible recov-
ery-conveyed to a named plaintiff prior to certification of the class moot
the entire class's claim and deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction.3 8
C. Class Certification and Mootness: The Article III Case
or Controversy Requirement
The United States Constitution requires that there be a case or con-
troversy in order for a federal court to possess subject matter jurisdiction
34. See FED. R. Crv. P. 68. The Rule provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judg-
ment to be taken against the defending party for the money or property
or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued.
Id.
35. See id. ("If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party
serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer
and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the
clerk shall enter judgment.").
36. See id. ("An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence
thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judg-
ment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the of-
feree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.").
37. See, e.g., Ian H. Fisher, Federal Rule 68, A Defendant's Subtle Weapon: Its Use
and Pitfalls, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 89, 95 (2001) ("Serious questions... exist whether
and when a defendant may make Rule 68 offers in the class context."). But see
Kelley, supra note 10, at 284 ("Under proper circumstances, an offer of judgment
or settlement can be an effective tool in destroying a class action because the de-
fendant can moot the named plaintiff's claim, deny them a personal stake in the
case, and bar them from representing the class.").
38. See Greenstein, supra note 1, at 900-01 (explaining situation in which
mootness doctrine collides with potential class action). Greenstein notes that:
[T]here are three ways in which a [class action] case may become moot:
(1) the issues presented by the class representative on behalf of both him-
self and the class may become moot; (2) only the issues presented on
behalf of the class may become moot, leaving the representative's per-
sonal claim to be adjudicated; or (3) only the issues presented on behalf
of the class representative may become moot, leaving the class claims to
be decided.
Id. As recognized by Greenstein, however, the difficulty arises when the represen-
tative plaintiffs claims have become moot, but the class claims are still alive. See id.
(noting that courts have no difficulty applying mootness doctrine when issues
presented by both class and named plaintiff may become moot, or when only
class's issues may become moot)..
1290 [Vol. 50: p. 1285
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over an action.3 9 Thus, when an individual ceases to have a "personal
stake" in the litigation, there is no longer a case or controversy, and the
court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. 40 This is commonly re-
ferred to as a moot case. 41 Whenever a case is deemed moot, the court
must dismiss the action, regardless of whether the parties motion for
dismissal.
42
As noted above, Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides for offers ofjudgment.43 If an offer ofjudgment for complete relief is
made to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim will generally be mooted be-
cause the plaintiff no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of the
case. 4 4 Should the same result be reached when the plaintiffs are suing
not only on their own behalf, but also on the behalf of "all those similarly
situated"?45 The answer to this question appears to depend upon the tim-
ing of the offer of judgment and whether a motion for certification is
pending or has been ruled on by the court. 46 An examination of relevant
Supreme Court precedent indicates an increasing tendency to allow cases
to go forward, notwithstanding the mootness of a named plaintiff's
claim.
47
39. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . .. [and] to Controversies
. . ..").
40. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (noting that
when controversies causing case are no longer at issue case becomes moot and
must be dismissed because court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction).
41. See, e.g., IA C.J.S. Mootness Generally § 76 (2005) ("[A] moot case is one in
which there is no real controversy or which seeks to determine an abstract ques-
tion which does not rest on existing facts or rights ....").
42. See FED. R. Clv. P. 12 (h) (3) (requiring dismissal of cases where court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction).
43. For a discussion of the Rule 68 offer of judgment, see supra notes 32-38
and accompanying text.
44. See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1991)) ("Once the defendant
offers to satisfy the plaintiff's entire demand, there is no dispute over which to
litigate and a plaintiff who refuses to acknowledge this loses outright, under FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1), because he has no remaining stake.").
45. See Koysza, supra note 4, at 787 (arguing that even if named plaintiff no
longer has "personal stake" in outcome, other class members exist to provide req-
uisite case or controversy).
46. See id. at 790 (noting that timing is critical to issues of mootness in class
action context). As discussed below, the law is well-settled regarding offers ofjudg-
ment made either after filing for certification or after the court has granted certifi-
cation. For a discussion of how class certification, or filing for class certification,
renders class actions impervious to mootness resulting from offers of judgment to
named plaintiffs, see infra notes 51-88 and accompanying text. The issue for dis-
cussion in this Casebrief, however, is when an offer ofjudgment is conveyed prior to
a named plaintiff's filing for class certification.
47. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's increasing tendency to find ex-
ceptions to the mootness doctrine and allow class actions to proceed, see infra
notes 51-88 and accompanying text. See also Koysza, supra note 4, at 789 (noting
flexible approach of Supreme Court to issues of justiciability).
2005] CASEARIEF 1291
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1. The Stance of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged the difficulty in rec-
onciling the cases that have dealt with mootness in the class action con-
text.48 Nonetheless, the overarching theme since the 1970s has been
"increased access to the federal courts for class litigants within the frame-
work of shaky constitutional principles."49 The Court has carved-out mul-
tiple exceptions to the traditional mootness doctrine in the decisions
discussed below.
5 0
Today, it is settled law that a properly certified class action may con-
tinue, even if the named plaintiffs claim has been rendered moot.51 In
Sosna v. Iowa,52 the Court held that even though the claim of the named
plaintiff had become moot, a controversy could still exist between the
named defendant and the certified class. 53 In Sosna, a plaintiff sought
certification of her suit as a class action in order to represent other Iowa
residents who wished to initiate marriage dissolution proceedings, but who
were barred by a state residency statute. 54 After the district court certified
the class, the plaintiff continued to reside in Iowa, thereby satisfying the
Iowa statutory residency requirements.5 5 The state argued that the claim
was moot and should be dismissed. 56
In rejecting the state's argument, the Court found that certification of
the class provided the unnamed members of the class a legal status sepa-
rate from the named plaintiff.5 7 The Sosna Court stated that so long as a
named plaintiff with the requisite case or controversy is involved in the suit
at the time of certification, the case is not deemed moot by an offer of
48. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 n.ll (1980) ("We
concede that the prior cases may be said to be somewhat confusing, and that some,
perhaps, are irreconcilable with others."); see also Greenstein, supra note 1, at 897-
98 (aspiring to disentangle Court's "confusing" and "irreconcilable" opinions re-
garding justiciability).
49. See Greenstein, supra note 1, at 897 (discussing patchwork nature of Su-
preme Court cases addressing mootness in class action context).
50. For a discussion of the mootness exceptions created by the Supreme
Court to deal with the unique challenges of class actions, see infra notes 51-88 and
accompanying text.
51. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975) (allowing plaintiff to main-
tain her class action challenge although issue was deemed moot under traditional
mootness principles because of plaintiff's action subsequent to class certification);
Koysza, supra note 4, at 787 (discussing evolution of mootness doctrine when ap-
plied to class action context).
52. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
53. See id. at 402 (providing reasons for holding that plaintiff's claim is not
moot).
54. See id. at 397 (stating facts).
55. See id. (same).
56. See id. (recounting defendants' argument).
57. See id. at 397 n.8 ("The certification of a suit as a class action has impor-
tant consequences for the unnamed members of the class ... [because] it is con-
templated that the decision will bind all persons who have been found at the time
of certification to be members of the class.").
1292 [Vol. 50: p. 1285
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judgment. 58 Although the Sosna Court did not specifically rely on the rela-
tion-back doctrine for its holding, the doctrine was nevertheless intro-
duced in the dicta of the opinion and employed in multiple cases shortly
thereafter.
5 9
Under the relation-back doctrine, the date of the certification is con-
sidered to be the same date as the filing of the original complaint. 60 This
provides an exception to the traditional mootness doctrine, thereby al-
lowing class actions to continue. 6 1 Despite being introduced in a foot-
note, the relation-back doctrine has reappeared as the central
58. See id. at 402 (providing reasons why Court's holding does not detract
from constitutional case or controversy requirement).
59. See id. at 399-400 (stating Court's reasoning). The Sosna Court held that
the case was justiciable regardless of the mootness of the plaintiff's claim because
the class had been certified prior to the mooting of the plaintiffs claim. See id.
(same). Further, the problem was "capable of repetition yet evading review." Id.
The Court went on to state in dicta:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the named plain-
tiff is such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can
reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion. In such in-
stances, whether the certification can be said to "relate back" to the filing
of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would
evade review.
Id. at 402 n.ll. During the same year as the Sosna decision, the Court applied the
relation-back doctrine. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107-10 (1975) (applying
relation-back doctrine). In Gerstein, the plaintiffs challenged state pretrial deten-
tion procedures, however, the time period was so short that the plaintiffs' claims
were rendered moot prior to certification. See id. at 107, 110 n.11 (stating facts).
The Court held that despite the mootness of the representative's claim, the certifi-
cation would relate back to a time prior to the mooting of the claim. See id. at 110
n.11 (incorporating relation-back doctrine into Court's holding). Not long after
Gerstein, the Court applied the relation-back doctrine without requiring an issue
that is capable of repetition yet evading review remain. See Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 754 (1976) (applying relation-back doctrine without
requiring issue capable of repetition that evades review).
60. See, e.g., U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1980)
(explaining how Court has rendered time of filing for class certification
nondeterminative because, if requirements for exception under relation-back doc-
trine are met, filing for certification relates back to date of original claim).
61. See White v. OSI Collections Servs., Inc., No. 01-CV-1343(ARR), 2001 WL
1590518, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001) ("When a court relates class certification
back to the original filing of the complaint, the putative class representatives retain
standing to litigate the question of class certification even though their individual
claims are moot."); Koysza, supra note 4, at 804 (explaining that application of
relation-back doctrine "relates back" motions for class certification to date of filing
of original complaint, thereby allowing court to retain subject matter jurisdiction
although plaintiffs claim is rendered moot); Don Zupanec, Law and Motion-Cases
at a Glance, 19 FED. LITIG. 1, 8 (2004) ("The relation back rule recognizes that, to
give effect to the purpose of F.R.C.P. 23 [class actions], it may be necessary in some
circumstances to consider a named plaintiff part of an indivisible class, not simply
an individual, prior to a certification ruling.").
12932005] CASEBRIEF
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underpinning for decisions holding that full offers of judgment to plain-
tiffs do not render class actions moot.
62
In addition to the principle announced in Sosna, it is well-settled that
a member of a putative class may appeal a denial of class certification,
regardless of whether the named plaintiff's claim is moot.63 In United
States Airlines v. McDonald,64 a putative class member filed a motion to in-
tervene after a district court's denial of class certification. 65 The motion
to intervene was filed after the named plaintiff had settled with the defen-
dant.66 Nevertheless, the McDonald Court reasoned that because the re-
spondent was a putative member of the original class, and the motion to
intervene for appeal was timely filed, no justification existed to bar the
respondent from appeal. 67 Once again, the Court emphasized the distinc-
tion between the interests of the named plaintiff and the interests of the
putative class members. 68
Then, in a pair of decisions decided on the same day,6 9 the Court
held that named plaintiffs may appeal the denial of class certification,
even if their individual claim is moot.70 In United States Parole Commission
v. Geraghty,71 the named plaintiff brought a class action challenging the
United States Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines. 72 The dis-
trict court denied the class certification, and the plaintiff subsequently ap-
pealed to the Third Circuit.73 Before the appeal could take place,
however, Geraghty was released from prison. 74 Upon granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court held the claim to be justiciable by applying the rela-
62. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (apply-
ing relation-back doctrine to "inherently transitory" claims); Geraghty, 445 U.S. at
399 (same); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 348 n.16 (3d Cir. 2004) (ap-
plying relation-back doctrine to claim characterized as transitory because claim was
acutely susceptible to mootness).
63. See U.S. Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 393-95 (1977) (refusing to bar
plaintiff from opportunity to appeal class certification denial).
64. 432 U.S. 385 (1977)
65. See id. at 387 (stating facts).
66. See id. at 389 (noting that original parties agreed upon award amounts for
each plaintiff and court dismissed action).
67. See id. at 393-94 (explaining reasoning for Court's holding).
68. See id. at 394 (allowing plaintiff to appeal because "as soon as it became
clear to the respondent that the interests of the unnamed class members would no
longer be protected by the named class representatives, she promptly moved to
intervene to protect those interests").
69. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); U.S. Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
70. See Roper, 445 U.S. at 339-40 (refusing to dismiss case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction); Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 (same).
71. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
72. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 390 (stating facts).
73. See id. at 393 (noting procedural posture).
74. See id. at 394 (stating facts).
[Vol. 50: p. 12851294
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tion-back doctrine. 75 The Court also revived the "capable of repetition
but evading review" doctrine by noting that some claims may require rela-
tion-back because of their "inherently transitory" nature. 76
The Court, however, took a slightly different approach in Deposit Guar-
anty National Bank v. Roper.77 Roper involved a class action brought by
credit card holders challenging finance charges applied to their ac-
counts. 78 Following a denial of class certification by the district court, the
defendants tendered the plaintiffs the maximum individual award. 79 Ac-
cording to the Roper Court, the case was still justiciable because the named
plaintiffs retained an interest in sharing the expenses of the litigation with
other members of the class.80 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
mooting the entire case would defeat the purpose of class actions and in-
vite waste of judicial resources.8 1
Recently, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin ("Riverside"),82 the Court
expanded upon the rationales employed in Roper and Geraghty.8 1 In River-
side, the Court held that a putative class action may proceed regardless of
whether the named plaintiffs claim has been mooted, provided that the
named plaintiff's claim is "'so inherently transitory that the trial court will
75. See id. at 404 n.II ("We merely hold that when a District Court errone-
ously denies a procedural motion, which, if correctly decided, would have pre-
vented the action from becoming moot, an appeal lies from the denial and the
corrected ruling 'relates back' to the date of the original denial.").
76. See id. at 399 ("Some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court
will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before
the proposed representative's individual interest expires.").
77. 445 U.S. 326 (1980). In Roper, the Court did not explicitly rely on the
relation-back doctrine. See id. at 333 (holding that neither rejected offer of judg-
ment nor forced dismissal of plaintiff's case "terminate [s] the named plaintiffs'
right to take an appeal on the issue of class certification").
78. See id. at 329 (stating facts).
79. See id. at 329-30 (same). The Fifth Circuit subsequently denied the plain-
tiffs' motion for an interlocutory appeal to challenge the class certification denial.
See id. at 329 (same). Following the denial of appeal, the bank tendered to each
plaintiff an "Offer of Defendant to Enter Judgment as by Consent and Without
Waiver of Defenses or Admission of Liability." Id. The plaintiffs rejected the offer.
See id. (stating facts). Nevertheless, the court entered judgment based upon the
offer and dismissed the action. See id. at 329-30 (same).
80. See id. at 340 (providing justification for exception to traditional mootness
doctrine). The Geraghty Court expressed similar sentiment regarding economic
justifications for allowing the case to proceed. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 (same).
The Roper Court further explained that a central concept behind Rule 23 class
action lawsuits is to provide claimants, especially those with small claims, a cost
effective means of redress. See Roper, 445 U.S. at 338 n.9 (noting that attomey's fee
would typically exceed value of individual judgment); see also Phair, supra note 20,
at 837 ("By spreading the cost of litigation across a class, a greater number of
litigants are able to pool their resources in an effort to vindicate their rights.").
81. See Roper, 445 U.S. at 339 (looking to purpose of Rule 23 in deciding
whether claim was moot).
82. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
83. See id. at 52 (1991) (refusing to find plaintiffs claim moot under tradi-
tional mootness jurisprudence by using "inherently transitory" exception).
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not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification
before the proposed representative's individual interest expires."'
84
The plaintiff in Riverside brought a class action requesting the district
court to order the County of Riverside to alter its policies for providing
hearings to in-custody arrestees who were arrested without warrants. 85
The plaintiff filed for class certification shortly after filing the complaint.
86
By this time, however, the plaintiff had been provided a hearing. 87 The
Supreme Court used the relation-back doctrine introduced in Sosna to
find that the district court retained jurisdiction over the case.8 8
2. The District Courts: Two Distinct Approaches
Although the above examination of Supreme Court jurisprudence in-
dicates a flexible approach to mootness issues, the lower federal courts are
divided when deciding if a court is stripped of subject matter jurisdiction
when, prior to class certification, full offers ofjudgment to a named plain-
tiff are made. 89 The first approach is exemplified by Ambalu v. Rosen-
blatt.90 Generally stated, this approach holds that if the sole named
plaintiff's claim is rendered moot, the case must be dismissed. 91 The sec-
ond approach used by the district courts is demonstrated in Liles v. Ameri-
can Corrective Counseling Services, Inc.92 Under this approach, cases are not
moot if the offer of judgment is prematurely extended, or if the motion
84. Id. (quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 399).
85. See id. at 48 (noting relief sought by plaintiff). Specifically, McDonald
asked the court for "'an order and judgment requiring that defendants and the
County of Riverside provide in-custody arrestees, arrested without warrants,
prompt probable cause, bail and arraignment hearings.'" Id.
86. See id. at 48-50 (stating facts).
87. See id. (discussing timeline of case).
88. See id. at 52 ("[Here] the 'relation back' doctrine is properly invoked to
preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution."). For a discussion of the
relation-back doctrine, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
89. See Koysza, supra note 4, at 791-92 (highlighting two distinct approaches
that federal district courts use). The majority of case law cited in this Casebrief, as
in Koysza's article, is district court decisions. See id. at 791 (noting lack of circuit
court guidance on issues associated with subject matter jurisdiction and giving
named plaintiffs Rule 68 full offers ofjudgment). This is because the Third Cir-
cuit was the first court of appeals to address this issue when it decided Weiss v. Regal
Collections. See Fisher, supra note 37, at 90 (remarking on anomalous fact that no
federal court of appeals [prior to Weiss] has addressed whether Rule 68 offers of
full judgment deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction in class action context).
90. 194 F.R.D. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
91. See, e.g., id. at 453 ("If a named representative's claim becomes moot
before class certification, the entire case is to be dismissed for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction."); see also MooPE, supra note 3, § 68.03[3], at 68-17 (noting differ-
ing district court approaches).
92. 201 F.R.D. 452 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
1296
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for certification is made within the ten-day period in which the offer re-
mains open.9 3 Both approaches have significant adherents. 4
In Ambalu, the named plaintiff brought an action under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or "Act") on behalf of himself and a class
of similarly situated individuals.9 5 Prior to class certification, the defen-
dant made an offer of judgment equivalent to the maximum statutory al-
lowance under the FDCPA.96 In dismissing the claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court stated: "[h]aving offered all that Ambalu
could hope to recover through this litigation, 'there is no justification for
taking the time of the court and the defendant in the pursuit of [a] minis-
cule individual claim[ ] which [the] defendant has . . . satisfied.' ' 9 7 As
evidenced by this statement, the Ambalu court explicitly refused to recog-
nize the legal status of the putative class.98
In Liles, a factually similar case that also arose under the FDCPA, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reached the
93. See MooRE, supra note 3, § 68.03[3], at 68-17 (noting differing district
court approaches). Although these cases do not find the claim moot, they do not
explicitly rely on the relation-back doctrine. See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385
F.3d 337, 347 n.16 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[S]everal cases have declined to dismiss the
class claims on mootness grounds even when the Rule 68 offer came before the
filing of a motion for class certification, but these cases have not explicitly relied
on the relation back doctrine.").
94. Other courts have followed Ambalu. See, e.g., Edge v. C. Tech Collections,
Inc., 203 F.R.D. 85, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("This Court joins Judges McMahon and
Glasser in wholeheartedly agreeing with the sound reasoning of Judge Nickerson
in Ambalu."); Tratt v. Retreival Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., No. 00-CV-4560
(ILG), 2001 WL 667602, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001) ("1 simply adopt Judge
Nickerson's opinion [in Ambalu] as being entirely dispositive here. . . ."); Wilner v.
OSI Collection Servs., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("I agree whole-
heartedly with Judge Nickerson's reasoning [in Ambalul."), modified by 201 F.R.D.
321 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Some courts have followed Liles. See, e.g., Bond v. Fleet Bank
(RI), N.A., No. CIV.A. 01-177L, 2002 WL 373475, at *5 (D.R.I. Feb. 21, 2002) (re-
fusing to allow defendant to render case moot by making offer of judgment six
days after filing of complaint); White v. OSI Collection Servs., Inc., No. 01-CV-1343
(ARR), 2001 WL 1590518, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001) (precluding defendant
from rendering case moot by making offer of judgment day after complaint was
filed); Crisci v. Shalala, 169 F.R.D. 563, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]his Court must
consider the potential ability of defendants to 'purposefully moot the named plain-
tiffs' claim after the class action complaint has been filed but before the class has
been properly certified.'" (quoting Goetz v. Crosson, 728 F. Supp. 995, 1000
(S.D.N.Y. 1999))).
95. See Ambalu, 194 F.R.D. at 452 (articulating plaintiffs cause of action).
96. See id. at 452 (noting that defendant offered plaintiff §§ 1692(k) (a) (1)-(3)
statutory maximum of $1,000 and cost of action).
97. Id. at 453 (quoting Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 32 (2d Cir.
1983)).
98. See id. at 453 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that offer ofjudgment fails to
compensate for entire class "because no class has been certified and plaintiff has
not moved for certification").
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opposite result.99 In Liles, the defendant conveyed a full offer ofjudgment
to the plaintiff for the statutory maximum.10 0 The Liles court held that
the plaintiff's claim was not moot and expressly rejected the reasoning of
Ambalu, stating that "[i]n essence, the Ambalu court permitted the defen-
dant to pay off the named plaintiff and preemptively force an end to the
putative class action."101 The Third Circuit, however, did not adopt the
approach of either Ambalu or Liles.
a0 2
11. THE THIRD CIRCUIT "RELATES-BACK" IN WEISS V. REGAL COLLECTIONS
Weiss, a case of first impression, required the Third Circuit to decide
whether the district court erroneously deemed a case moot when an offer
ofjudgment for a statutory maximum was made to the individual plaintiff,
but offered no relief to the putative class. 10 3 The Third Circuit found that
the dismissal had been erroneous and reversed the district court's rul-
ing. 10 4 The court held that, absent undue delay in filing a motion for class
certification, the plaintiffs filing for class certification should relate back
to the complaint's original filing date. 10 5 This preserved the court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the claim. 10 6
99. See Liles v. Am. Corrective Counseling Servs., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 452, 455
(2001) (finding justiciable controversy despite full offer ofjudgment prior to class
certification).
100. See id. at 454 (stating facts).
101. See id. (explaining why court found logic of Ambalu flawed). The Liles
court took issue with the Ambalu court for citing Board of School Commissioners v.
Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975), to support its holding that a plaintiffs claim is moot
when defendant conveys a full offer ofjudgment prior to class certification. See id.
at 454 (criticizing Ambalu decision). The Liles court was quick to distinguish Jacobs
from both Ambalu and the case before them. See id. (same). The distinguishing
characteristic, according to the Liles court, was that the claims of the plaintiffs in
Jacobs were mooted because of the plaintiffs' graduation from high school, not
because of an offer of judgment forcing mootness on them. See id. (same); see also
Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The notion that a
defendant may short-circuit a class action by paying off the class representatives
either with the acquiescence or, as here, against their will, deserves short shrift.").
102. See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 358 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding
that Weiss can file motion in trial court). For a further discussion of the Third
Circuit's refusal to follow either the Ambalu or Liles approach, see infra notes 140-
61 and accompanying text.
103. See id. at 342 ("Because defendants' Rule 68 offer included no relief for
the putative class, either under the provisions of the FDCPA or through the aggre-
gation of class claims, we address the mootness question in that context."). The
Third Circuit had one opportunity to address this issue prior to Weiss, but the case
was dismissed on an unrelated procedural issue. See Colbert v. Dymacol, Inc., 302
F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that if defendant makes full offer ofjudgment to
named plaintiff prior to certification case is moot and court loses jurisdiction),
vacated by 305 F.3d 1256, 1256 (3d Cir. 2002), dismissed en banc, 344 F.3d 334, 334
(3d Cir. 2003).
104. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348 (stating holding).
105. See id. (same).
106. See id. (same).
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A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In 2001, Richard Weiss filed a class action complaint against Regal
Collections ("Regal") alleging unfair debt collection practices.1 0 7 Before
Weiss's attorneys filed for class certification, Regal's defense lawyers made
a Rule 68 offer of judgment to Weiss of $1,000 plus reasonable attorneys'
fees-the maximum amount that an individual can recover under the
FDCPA.10 8 Weiss, however, declined to accept this offer of judgment.10 9
Despite Weiss's rejection of the offer, Regal argued that Weiss's claim
was rendered moot by the offer and moved to dismiss the case.110 The
district court agreed, granting the defendant's motion to dismiss due to
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 1 On appeal, Weiss argued that the
offer of judgment by Regal did not moot his claim because he sought re-
covery for a putative nationwide class. 1 1
2
B. The Third Circuit's Analysis and Its Use of the Relation-Back Doctrine
In a unanimous decision the Third Circuit determined, as a threshold
matter, that the offer made by Regal was indeed a full offer of judg-
ment.1 13 In doing so, the Third Circuit joined the majority of courts,
which have recognized that the FDCPA does not provide for declaratory
or injunctive relief.114 After determining Regal's offer did provide the
107. See id. at 339 (stating facts).
108. See Shannon P. Duffy, Defendants Cannot 'Pick Off Class Plaintiffs, PA. L.
WKLY., Oct. 11, 2004, at 16 (discussing procedural posture of case); see also 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2) (B) (2004) (setting statutory limit of recovery for individual
as $1,000 plus reasonable attorneys' fees, and "$500,000 or 1 per centum of the net
worth of the debt collector" for class actions).
109. SeeJennifer R. Sentivan, Offer of Judgment to Named Plaintiff Did Not Moot
the Claims of the Class, N.J. LAw. WKv., Oct. 11, 2004, at 18 (commenting on facts of
case).
110. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340 (recounting events at district court trial).
111. See id. (discussing trial court's holding).
112. See id. at 342 (phrasing Weiss's argument on appeal).
113. See id. at 340-42 (finding that offer of $1,000 plus reasonable attorneys'
fees was statutory maximum relief allowed under FDCPA). Weiss's complaint had
requested declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. at 340 (discussing whether de-
fendant's offer was in fact offer of "full"judgment). The court, however, held that
no injunctive or declaratory relief was available because there was no explicit provi-
sion in the FDCPA providing for declaratory or injunctive relief, and most courts
have not found such relief available. See id. at 341-42 (stating holding). Because
no injunctive or declaratory relief was available, the offer conveyed to Weiss pro-
vided all the relief available to him as an individual plaintiff. See id. at 342 (same).
114. See Matthew J. Hank, Third Circuit: Offer of Complete Relief Under Rule 68
Does Not Moot Claim for Class Relief PEPPER HAMILTON COM. LITIG. REP. (Dec. 2004),
at http://www.pepperlaw.com/pepper/publications-update.cfm?rid= 6 0 6 .0 (last
visited June 21, 2005) (discussing implications of Weiss and noting that Third Cir-
cuit joined majority of courts when it determined that offer of $1,000 and attor-
neys' fees is maximum offer to individual plaintiff under FDCPA).
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maximum relief available to Weiss, the court turned its attention to the
mootness issue. 1
15
1. The Supreme Court Does Not Approve of Defendants Picking Off Named
Plaintiffs
In analyzing the issue, the court found that Supreme Court case law
indicated disapproval of defendants who use offers ofjudgment to pick off
class action plaintiffs.' 16 The Third Circuit admitted that " [t]he question
of mootness in the class action context is not a simple one."' 1 7 The court
then turned to the Geraghty and Roper decisions for guidance.'
18
The Third Circuit noted that the Roper opinion expressed concern
about a class action defendant's ability to pick off plaintiffs. 119 The Third
Circuit was quick to note, however, that the issue addressed in Roper was
not identical to the one at hand because a motion for class certification
had been made and denied in Roper.120 The Weiss court also noted that
the holding in Roper was a limited one.12 ' Nonetheless, the Third Circuit
concluded that the central concerns about defendants picking off plain-
tiffs in Roper were at play in Weiss and similar cases under the FDCPA.
122
115. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 342 (beginning court's analysis).
116. See id. at 342-44 (reciting Supreme Court case law); Sara Hoffman
Jurand, Offer ofJudgment Does Not Derail Class Action, Third Circuit Holds, 40 TRLk. 61
(2004) (discussing Weiss court's analysis of relevant Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
117. Weiss, 385 F.3d at 342 (citing Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974
(3d Cir. 1992)).
118. See id. at 342-44 (conducting case law analysis).
119. See id. at 343 ("Of special significance to this appeal, in Roper, the Su-
preme Court expressed concern at a defendant's ability to 'pick off named plain-
tiffs by mooting their private individual claims."); see also Koysza, supra note 4, at
792-93 ("Courts and commentators alike have recognized the destructive effect on
the class action device of the practice of picking off named plaintiffs.").
120. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 343 ("We recognize Roper addressed a different is-
sue."). In Roper, a motion for certification had been made and denied prior to the
offer of judgment by the defendants. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326, 332 (1980) (discussing procedural posture of case). In Weiss, the offer of
judgment was conveyed prior to a motion for class certification. See Weiss, 385 F.3d
at 339 (discussing timeline of action).
121. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 n.10 ("We also acknowledge Roper specifically
limited its holding, stating: 'Difficult questions arise as to what, if any, are the
named plaintiffs' responsibilities to the putative class prior to certification; this case
does not require us to reach these questions.'" (quoting Roper, 445 U.S. at 340
n.12)).
122. See id. at 344 n.Il ("'The rationale animating the Court's determination
[in Roper] ... speaks directly to the concerns present here.'" (quoting White v. OSI
Collection Servs., Inc., No. 01-CV-1343(ARR), 2001 WL 1590518 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
2001))).
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2. Offers of Judgment Are Suspect in Class Actions
The application of Rule 68 is strained in the class action context.
123
According to the Weiss court, offers of judgment to a named plaintiff
threaten to "undercut close court supervision of class action settlements,
create conflicts of interests for named plaintiffs, and encourage premature
class certification motions."1 24 The court then compared the Weiss situa-
tion to that in Roper, and reasoned that if defendants are allowed to pick
off plaintiffs through the use of Rule 68 offers of judgment less than two
months after the filing of the original complaint, the viability of the class
action procedure may be substantially undercut.1
25
3. Offers ofJudgment That Moot Putative Class Claims Contravene the
Purpose of Rules 23 and 68, and Defeat the Intent of Congress
Allowing defendants to moot the claim of putative class members is
contrary to the purposes of Rule 23.126 In Weiss, the Third Circuit quoted
Roperwhile noting that one of the primary purposes of class action lawsuits
123. See id. at 344 ("As sound as is Rule 68 when applied to individual plain-
tiffs, its application is strained when an offer of judgment is made to a class repre-
sentative."). Most courts that have examined the application of Rule 68 offers
employed in class actions have found Rule 68 applicable. See, e.g., Gordon v. Gou-
line, 81 F.3d 235, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (allowing case to settle through Rule 68
offer); White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); Blair v.
Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1517-18 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Garrity v. Sununu, 752
F.2d 727, 730-33 (1st Cir. 1984) (same); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1329
(5th Cir. 1977) (same). Although the majority of courts find no problem with
allowing Rule 68 offers in the class action context, at least two district courts have
expressly prohibited such use of Rule 68 offers. See Schaake v. Risk Mgmt. Alterna-
tives, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[Ilt has long been recognized
that Rule 68 Offers of Judgment have no applicability to matters legitimately
brought as class actions pursuant to Rule 23."); Martin v. Mabus, 734 F. Supp.
1216, 1222 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (holding that Rule 68 is inapplicable to class actions
because court approval is required before settlement).
124. Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 n.12 (citing cases that have taken note of question-
able application of Rule 68 to class action lawsuits); see also 12 CHARLEs ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3001.1, at 76
(2d ed. 1997) ("There is much force to the contention that, as a matter of policy
[Rule 68] should not be employed in class actions."); MooRE, supra note 3,
§ 68.03[3], at 68-15 ("[Policy and practicality considerations make application of
the offer ofjudgment rule to class and derivative actions questionable."); CONTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 15.36, at 115 ("[B]y denying the mandatory imposition
of Rule 68 in class actions, class representative will not be forced to abandon their
litigation posture each time they are threatened with the possibility of incurring
substantial cost for the sake of absent class members.").
125. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 (highlighting tension between Rules 23 and
68).
126. See id. at 345 ("Allowing defendants to 'pick off' putative-lead plaintiffs
contravenes one of the primary purposes of class actions-the aggregation of nu-
merous similar (especially small) claims in a single action."); see also Zupanec, supra
note 61 (discussing reasoning of Weiss court). For a detailed discussion of how
Rule 68 offers of judgment defeat the purpose of class actions, see Greenstein,
supra note 1, at 897-926 (summarizing Supreme Court's past treatment of class
action mootness problem and exploring possible solutions).
20051 CASEBRIEF 1301
17
Lueck: The Third Circuit Adopts the Relation-Back Doctrine to Prevent De
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
A/t- T -fT-AW T A-7 D--- rLT-1 MC. 1 QO,.
LI - - j -J*
is to allow plaintiffs to allocate their costs among the members of the
class. 127 The Weiss court also noted that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized, "[c]lass actions . . . may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which
would be uneconomical to litigate individually." 12 8 The Third Circuit
held the above-mentioned purposes to be irreconcilable with Rule 68 of-
fers of judgment.1 29
Furthermore, the Third Circuit found that allowing plaintiffs to be
picked off could lead to the wasting of judicial resources.13 0 This would
be contrary to the purposes of Rule 68, which was enacted to promote
settlements and avoid litigation.1 3 1 "Allowing plaintiffs to be 'picked off
at an early stage in a putative class action may waste judicial resources by
'stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement,"'
thereby failing to promote settlements or avoid litigation.' 3 2
The Third Circuit also emphasized that allowing defendants to moot
the claim of putative class members defeats the congressional intent be-
hind the enactment of statutes such as the FDCPA.133 The Weiss court
recognized that Congress specifically provided for class damages under
the FDCPA, and that the Act was to be self-enforcing by private attorney
generals.' 3 4 The court found that defendants served with a class action
complaint could simply tender the maximum settlement amount, derail-
ing the putative class and thereby frustrating the goal and enforcement
mechanism of the FDCPA. 135
127. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344-45 ("'A significant benefit to claimants who
choose to litigate their individual claims in a class action context is the prospect of
reducing their costs .. '" (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S.
326, 338 n.9 (1980))).
128. Id. at 345 (quoting Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809
(1985)). The Weiss court also stated that "[t]his '[c]ost-spreading can also en-
hance the means for private attorney general enforcement and the resulting deter-
rence of wrongdoing."' Id. at 345 (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp., Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995)).
129. See id. at 344-45 (explaining that allowing defendants to derail class ac-
tions through offers ofjudgment negates benefits of class action device).
130. See id. at 345 (noting that Rule 68 serves to preserve judicial resources
through promoting settlements).
131. See id. (providing reasons for holding that tension between Rules 23 and
68 should be resolved in favor of Rule 23).
132. Id. (quoting Roper, 445 U.S. at 339).
133. See id. (rejecting defendant's argument that offer of judgment rendered
case moot partly because it would "frustrate Congress's explicit directive").
134. See id. (noting that statutes such as FDCPA are enacted by Congress with
class actions envisioned as means of resolving disputes).
135. See id. (discussing reasons why allowing defendants to pick off plaintiffs
in class action frustrates congressional intent).
I q09
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4. Relation-Back Is the Proper Way to Resolve the Tension Between Rules 23
and 68
The Weiss court ultimately held that, in situations where there is no
undue delay in filing for certification by the plaintiff, the relation-back
doctrine should apply.136 In analyzing the relation-back doctrine, the
court noted that in FDCPA cases offers of judgment are often made prior
to a court's consideration of class certification.1 3 7 The Weiss court then
turned to existing precedent, noting that the Supreme Court has used the
relation-back doctrine in the class action context, but under different cir-
cumstances. 138 Although the court noted that Weiss's claims were not "in-
herently transitory," as were the claims in Riverside, the Weiss court
nonetheless applied the relation-back doctrine because the claim was
"acutely susceptible to mootness," rendering the claim transitory. 139
IV. THE APPROACH OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT Is LIKELY TO
BE ADOPTED IN OTHER CIRCUITS
Although no other circuit court has addressed the precise issue
presented in Weiss, case law indicates that the relation-back doctrine is
likely to be adopted in other circuits and employed where offers ofjudg-
136. See id. at 348 (stating holding). Although the Weiss court did not define
"undue delay," it did not find six weeks to be an undue delay. See id. at 348 n.18
(noting that defendants made offer of judgment six weeks after amended com-
plaint was filed). For further discussion of the rules governing the timely filing of
motions for certification, see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
137. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 346 (recognizing that FDCPA plaintiffs are espe-
cially susceptible to being picked off); see also Koysza, supra note 4, at 790 (empha-
sizing importance of "precise timing" as it relates to employing Rule 68 in
successful litigation strategy).
138. See id. at 346-47 (summarizing history of relation-back doctrine in Su-
preme Court jurisprudence). The Supreme Court has repeatedly expanded upon
the relation-back doctrine since its introduction. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
399 (1975) (introducing relation-back doctrine as means to avoid mootness of
cases); U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980) (applying rela-
tion-back doctrine to claims that are "so inherently transitory that the trial court
will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before
the proposed representative's individual interest expires"); County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (applying "inherently transitory" exception to
claims). For a further discussion of these cases, see supra notes 51-88 and accom-
panying text.
139. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347 (quoting Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 797
(2d Cir. 1994)) (justifying application of relation-back doctrine). Claims under
the FDCPA and similar statutes are deemed acutely susceptible to mootness be-
cause such statutes set the maximum recovery for individuals at relatively low
amounts. See Comer, 37 F.3d at 797 (explaining reasons for recognition of claims as
acutely susceptible to mootness). Corner involved a series of racial discrimination
suits against a local administrator of public housing. See id. at 780 (describing
facts). Because of population fluidity in the housing market, the court reasoned
that the amount of harm caused to plaintiffs remained constant, albeit at a rela-
tively low amount. See id. at 797 (emphasizing reason for disagreement with lower
court).
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ment are made prior to class certification. 1 40 Moreover, legal scholars
have recognized that the approach taken by the Third Circuit is the logical
extension of previous Supreme Court cases. 141 These scholars also advo-
cate that the Third Circuit's relation-back approach is the most appropri-
ate way to resolve the tension between Rules 23 and 68.142
A. Adoption of the Weiss Approach by Other Circuits
As noted earlier, following the Sosna case, it became well established
that once the court has certified the class, the mooting of the named
plaintiff's claim does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.1 43 Several courts of appeals have expanded this holding by recogniz-
ing that a class obtains a separate status not only once certification has
been granted, but also once a party has filed for class certification. 14 4 The
Fifth Circuit is particularly likely to follow the Weiss approach because of
its concern with defendants deliberately picking off plaintiffs.1
4 5
140. For a discussion of why case law indicates that other circuits will adopt
the approach of the Third Circuit, see infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
141. See Koysza, supra note 4, at 802-05 (advocating extension of Riverside's
"inherently transitory" mootness exception to prevent mootness prior to plaintiffs
filing for class certification); MooRE, supra note 3, § 68.03[3] at 68-19 (recognizing
that Weiss approach is preferable because Supreme Court has approved use of rela-
tion-back doctrine under distinguishable yet similar circumstances).
142. See, e.g., Koysza, supra note 4, at 802-05 (predicting use of Riverside analy-
sis); MooRE, supra note 3, § 68.03 [3], at 68-19 (commending Weiss court analysis).
But see Greenstein, supra note 1, at 905-25 (arguing that relation-back doctrine is
not best way to resolve mootness issue in class action context). Greenstein states:
"If a case or controversy is needed for a federal court constitutionally to exercise
jurisdiction, and if class certification is necessary to raise the class claim to case-or-
controversy status, then it follows that the mooting of the class representative's
claims prior to certification ends the court's [A]rticle IIIjurisdiction." Id. at 905-
06. He doubts that the relation-back "fiction" resolves this dilemma and instead
argues that the case or controversy requirements are satisfied when the injured
parties plead for redress from the court. See id. at 926 (stating conclusion).
143. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's determination that class certifi-
cation prevents the entire action from being deemed moot when the named plain-
tiffs individual claim is rendered moot, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
For a detailed listing of cases allowing actions to proceed once certification has
been granted, regardless of whether the named plaintiff has a "stake" in the issue,
see Romualdo P. Eclavea, Mootness of Class Representative's Claim Pending Litigation as
Precluding Maintenance of Class Action Under Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
as Amended in 1966, 33 A.L.R. FED. 484, 510-15 (2004).
144. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1978)
("We consider the motion for certification, while pending, as sufficiently, though
provisionally, bringing the interest of class members before the court [to] ...
avoid a mootness artificially created by the defendant. . . ."); Roper v. Consurve,
Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that upon filing of class action
complaint, plaintiffs assume responsibility for unidentified members of class), affd
sub nom. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
145. See Roper, 445 U.S. at 339 (lamenting impropriety of allowing defendants
to pick off named plaintiffs).
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The Fifth Circuit has stated: " [t] he notion that a defendant may short
circuit a class action by paying off the class representatives either with their
acquiescence or, as here, against their will, deserves short shrift."146 The
Fifth Circuit has continued to express this concern in later cases.147 Fur-
thermore, the Fifth Circuit is likely to adopt the approach of the Third
Circuit because the Fifth Circuit has applied the relation-back doctrine,
albeit to factually different situations.
148
At least one district court, deciding a case factually similar to Weiss,
has explicitly relied upon the relation-back doctrine to retain subject mat-
terjurisdiction prior to a motion for class certification. 149 Of particular
concern to that court was the intentional nature of the defendant's action
in rendering the class representative's claim moot.1 5 0 The court stated
that allowing defendant's to pick off a named plaintiff essentially renders
the plaintiffs claim "so transitory that the court realistically could not ad-
dress the class certification issue, or, more precisely, the plaintiff realisti-
cally could not even bring the motion." 151 Although the court was specific
146. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1978).
147. See, e.g., Zeidman v.J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1049 (5th
Cir. 1981) (asserting reasons why defendants should not be permitted to pick off
named plaintiff through offer of judgment).
148. See id. at 1048-49 (applying relation-back doctrine to prevent mootness
where motion for certification was denied). In Zeidman, the court denied the
plaintiff's motion to certify the class. See id. at 1032 (stating facts). An offer of
judgment was then made to the plaintiff, rendering their claim moot. See id.
(same). The Zeidman court noted that a defendant could simply tender a plaintiff
the full amount of their personal claim and derail a putative class action. See id. at
1049-50 (providing reasons for application of relation-back doctrine).
149. See White v. OSI Collection Servs., Inc., No. 01-CV-1343(ARR), 2001 WL
1590518, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 5, 2001) (applying relation-back doctrine to pre-
vent moomess of class action). In White, the defendant made an offer ofjudgment
just one day after filing an answer and only eleven days after the plaintiff filed a
complaint under the FDCPA. See id. at *1 (stating facts). The plaintiff never filed
a motion for certification but, nonetheless, requested a promotion conference
where she expressed an intent to seek certification of the class. See id. (same).
150. See id. at *4-5 (examining cases where courts have noted importance of
defendant's intent to pick off plaintiffs when deciding whether to hold claim as
moot). The White court noted that many of the cases holding defendant's intent as
relevant did not involve application of the relation-back doctrine prior to certifica-
tion. See id. (distinguishing current case from other Second Circuit cases). None-
theless, the White court held, "[b] ecause the considerations animating the courts'
deliberations in these [other] cases, however, are identical to the concerns present
in this case, it is appropriate to apply the relation back doctrine to the specific facts
and circumstances of this case . . . ."). Id.
151. Id. at *4. The White court admitted that the plaintiffs claim was not in-
herently transitory. See id. at *4 n.7 (explaining reasons for applying relation-back
doctrine). The court took the same approach later used by the Third Circuit,
however, noting that the claims were "acutely susceptible to mootness" and, there-
fore, should be treated as inherently transitory. See id. (citing Comer v. Cisneros,
37 F.3d 775, 797 (2d Cir. 1994)) (noting that although "the nature of the plain-
tiff's claim is not inherently transitory" FDCPA provides maximum award of
$1,000, "[thus it may be financially feasible for the defendant to buy off successive
plaintiffs in the hopes of preventing class certification").
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in limiting its holding to the facts at hand-essentially applying relation-
back where there is no undue delay by the plaintiff-it nonetheless indi-
cates that other courts are amenable to the approach taken by the Third
Circuit in Weiss.1
52
B. Discussion in the Legal Community Indicates That the Approach of the
Weiss Court Will Be Adopted in Other Circuits
Prior to the Weiss decision, one commentator advocated applying the
Riverside "inherently transitory" exception to cases in which defendants
pick off plaintiffs. 153 The author argued that, although many class action
complaints are not "inherently transitory," these complaints should none-
theless be treated as such.' 54 According to the author, the Riverside hold-
ing was essentially premised upon the Court's refusal "to deprive plaintiffs
of the ability to employ the class action device solely because the plaintiffs'
claims, by no fault of the plaintiffs, were inherently transitory."' 55 That
author concluded that a named plaintiff's class certification motion
should relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint be-
cause, when defendants pick off plaintiffs, their claims are rendered transi-
tory through no fault of their own. 156
Similarly, other legal scholars argue that the Weiss decision was cor-
rect. 15 7 Moore's Federal Practice examined the approach taken by the Third
152. See id. at *6 ("At least in the limited circumstances presented by the in-
stant case, therefore,-when defendant's offer ofjudgment comes very early in the
litigation and before a plaintiff... can reasonably bring a motion to certify-it is
proper to apply the relation back exception even though no motion for class certi-
fication has yet been filed.").
153. See Koysza, supra note 4, at 804 (advocating application of relation-back
doctrine to cases involving offers ofjudgment prior to class certification). Prior to
advocating use of the relation-back doctrine, Koysza enumerates four specific rea-
sons why defendants should not be allowed to pick off plaintiffs. See id. at 793-98
(explaining why courts should adopt approaches to provide protection from moot-
ness until class certification decision is rendered). According to Koysza, the pick-
ing off of plaintiffs should not be permitted because: (1) it deprives plaintiffs of
the motivation and ability to bring their claims; (2) it creates a multiplicity of suits;
(3) it creates a "race" to the courthouse; and (4) it hinges the survival of the class
action on the timing of the motion for certification. See id. (same). Relation-back
avoids all of these difficulties. See id. (same).
154. See id. at 804 ("The central theory advanced by this Note is that the fac-
tual distinctions between Riverside and those cases in which defendants attempt to
pick off named plaintiffs should not be dispositive.").
155. Id.
156. See id. at 804-05 (endorsing judicial use of relation-back doctrine in situa-
tions factually similar to Riverside).
157. See MOORE, supra note 3, § 68.03[3], at 68-19 (commending Weiss court);
WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CML PROCE-
DURE BuEORE TRIAL Ch. 10 10:352 [15.7(c)] (2004) (concluding that reasoning
of Weiss court seems correct); Paul Mollica, More Daily Developments in EEO Law
(Sept. 30, 2004), at http://www.mmbmlaw.com/CM/DailyDevelopments/
September2004.asp ("The court did not foreclose entirely the use of Rule 68, such
as where plaintiff unreasonably delays moving for class certification. But in the
1306 [Vol. 50: p. 1285
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Circuit in Weiss and deemed it to be the most suitable for resolving the
tension between Rules 23 and 68.158 In Moore's Federal Practice, the author
argues that the relation-back analysis employed by the Supreme Court in
Riverside, and adopted by the Third Circuit in Weiss, should be used in all
class action cases where the filing of the class certification was not unduly
delayed. 15 9 Therefore, "if a Rule 68 offer that would moot the named
plaintiffs claim is made before the district court has had a reasonable op-
portunity to rule on class certification, the court should be able to retain
jurisdiction until it has a chance to decide whether to certify the class." 160
This, of course, is the approach adopted in Weiss.' 6 1
V. CONCLUSION
The conflict between Rules 23 and 68 should be resolved in favor of
Rule 23 through the application of the relation-back doctrine. The Third
Circuit approach is the best suited to ensure that Rule 23 is "construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action." 162 Were it not for the class action device, aggrieved
persons with claims that are not economically feasible to pursue in the
traditional lawsuit format would be without legal redress. 16 3 The relation-
back doctrine should be adopted and employed by the courts to ensure
that the class action device remains a viable means of legal redress for
those who were intended to benefit from its use.
Dennis Lueck
main, this was a good wholesome step to preserve the vitality of low-stake federal
class actions.").
158. See MooRE, supra note 3, § 68.03 [3], at 68-19 (citing Weiss v. Regal Col-
lections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2004)) (endorsing judicial use of relation-back
doctrine).
159. See id. (same).
160. Id.
161. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 346-48 (applying relation-back doctrine).
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
163. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 n.9 (1980) ("A
significant benefit to claimants who choose to litigate their individual claims in a
class-action context is the prospect of reducing their costs of litigation, particularly
attorney's fees, by allocating such costs among all members of the class who benefit
from any recovery.").
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